Symbolic models for security protocol verification, following the seminal ideas of Dolev and Yao, come in many flavors, even though they share the same ideas. A common assumption is that the attacker has complete control over the network: he can therefore intercept any message. Depending on the precise model this may be reflected either by the fact that any protocol output is directly routed to the adversary, or communications may be among any two participants, including the attacker -the scheduling between which exact parties the communication happens is left to the attacker. These two models may seem equivalent at first glance and, depending on the verification tools, either one or the other semantics is implemented. We show that, unsurprisingly, they indeed coincide for reachability properties. However, when we consider indistinguishability properties, we prove that these two semantics are incomparable. We also introduce a new semantics, where internal communications are allowed but messages are always eavesdropped by the attacker. We show that this new semantics yields strictly stronger equivalence relations. We also identify two subclasses of protocols for which the three semantics coincide. Finally, we implemented verification of trace equivalence for each of these semantics in the APTE tool and compare their performances on several classical examples. case in the original Dolev Yao model and also in the models underlying several tools, such as AVISPA [6], Scyther [13] , Tamarin [20], Millen and Shmatikov's constraint solver [17] , and the model used in Paulson's inductive approach [18] .
Introduction
Automated, symbolic analysis of security protocols, based on the seminal ideas of Dolev and Yao, comes is many variants. All of these models however share a few fundamental ideas:
messages are represented as abstract terms, adversaries are computationally unbounded, but may manipulate messages only according to pre-defined rules (this is sometimes referred to as the perfect cryptography assumption), and the adversary completely controls the network.
In this paper we will revisit this last assumption. Looking more precisely at different models we observe that this assumption may actually slightly differ among the models. The fact that the adversary controls the network is supposed to represent a worst case assumption.
In some models this assumption translates to the fact that every protocol output is sent to the adversary, and every protocol input is provided by the adversary. This is the For each of the new semantics we define may-testing and observational equivalences. We also define corresponding labelled semantics and trace equivalence and bisimulation relations (which may serve as proof techniques).
We show that, as expected, the three semantics coincide for reachability properties. For equivalence properties we show that the classical and private semantics yield incomparable equivalences, while the eavesdropping semantics yields strictly stronger equivalence relations than both other semantics. The results are summarized in Figure 7 .
An interesting question is whether these semantics coincide for specific subclasses of processes. We first note that the processes that witness the differences in the semantics do not use replication, private channels, nor terms other than names, and no equational theory. Moreover, all except one of these examples only use trivial else branches (of the form else 0); the use of a non-trivial else branch can however be avoided by allowing a single free symbol.
However conditions on the channel names may yield such a subclass. We first observe that the class of simple processes [12] , for which already observational, testing, trace equivalence and labelled bisimulation coincide, do have this property. Simple processes may however be too restrictive for modelling some protocols that should guarantee anonymity (as no parallel processes may share channel names). We therefore identify a syntactic class of processes, that we call I/O-unambiguous. For this class we forbid communication on private channels, communication of channel names and an output may not be sequentially followed by an input on the same channel directly, or with only conditionals in between. Note that I/O-unambiguous processes do however allow outputs and inputs on the same channel in parallel. We show that for this class the eavesdropping semantics (which is the most strict relation) coincides with the private one (which is the most efficient for verification).
Finally, we extended the APTE tool to support verification of trace equivalence for the three semantics. Verifying existing protocols in the APTE example repository we verified that the results, fortunately, coincided for each of the semantics. We also made slight changes to the encodings, renaming some channels, to make them I/Ounambiguous. Interestingly, using different channels, significantly increased the performance of the tool. Finally, we also observed that, as expected, the private semantics yields more efficient verification. The results of our experiments are summarized in Figure ? ?.
Outline. In Section 2 we define the three semantics we consider. In Section 3 we present our main results on comparing these semantics. We present subclasses for which (some) semantics coincide in Section 4 and compare the performances when verifying protocols for different semantics using APTE in Section 5, before concluding in Section 6.
Because of lack of space we did not include all proofs. Missing proofs are available in an extended [7] .
Model
The applied pi calculus [1] is a variant of the pi calculus that is specialised for modelling cryptographic protocols. Participants in a protocol are modelled as processes and the communication between them is modelled by message passing on channels. In this section, we describe the syntax and semantics of the applied pi calculus as well as the two new variants that we study in this paper.
Syntax
We consider an infinite set N of names of base type and an infinite set Ch of names of channel type. We also consider an infinite set of variables X of base type and channel type and a signature F consisting of a finite set of function symbols. We rely on a sort system for terms. In particular, the sort base type differs from the sort channel type. Moreover, any function symbol can only be applied and returns base type terms. We define terms as names, variables and function symbols applied to other terms. Given N ⊆ N , X ⊆ X and F ⊆ F, we denote by T (F, X, N ) the sets of terms built from X and N by applying function symbols from F . We denote f v(t) the sets of variables occurring in t. We say that t is ground if f v(t) = ∅. We describe the behaviour of cryptographic primitives by the means of an equational theory E that is a relation on terms closed under substitutions of terms for variables and closed under one-to-one renaming. Given two terms u and v, we write u = E v when u and v are equal modulo the equational theory.
In the original syntax of the applied pi calculus, there is no distinction between an output (resp. input) from a protocol participant and from the environment, also called the attacker. In this paper however, we will make this distinction in order to concisely present our new variants of the semantics. Therefore, we consider two process tags ho and at that respectively represent honest and attacker actions. The syntax of plain processes and extended processes is given in Figure 1 .
where u and v are base type terms, n is a name, x is a variable and c is a name or variable of channel type, θ is a tag, i.e. θ ∈ {ho, at}. The process out θ (c, u) represents the output by θ of the message u on the channel c. The process in θ (c, x) represents an input by θ on the channel c. The input message will instantiate the variable x. The process eav(c, x) models the capability of the attacker to eavesdrop a communication on channel c. The process !P represents the replication of the process P , i.e. unbounded number of copies of P . The process P | Q represents the parallel composition of P and Q. The process νn.P (resp. νx.A) is the restriction of the name n in P (resp. variable x in A). The process if u = v then P else Q is the conditional branching under the equality test u = v. The process ωc records that a private channel c has been opened, i.e., it has been sent on a public or previously opened channel. Finally, the substitution { u / x } is an active substitution that replaces the variable x with the term u of base type.
We say that a process P (resp. extended process A) is an honest process (resp. honest extended process) when all inputs and outputs in P (resp. A) are tagged with ho and when P (resp. A) does not contain eavesdropping processes and ωc. We say that a process P (resp. extended process A) is an attacker process (resp. attacker extended process) when all inputs and outputs in P (resp. A) are tagged with at.
As usual, names and variables have scopes which are delimited by restrictions, inputs and eavesdrops. We denote f v(A), bv(A), f n(A), bn(A) the sets of free variables, bound variables, free names and bound names respectively in A. Moreover, we denote by oc(A) the sets of terms c of channel type opened in A, i.e. that occurs in a process ωc. We say that an extended process A is closed when all variables in A are either bound or defined by an active substitution in A. We define an evaluation context C[ ] as an extended process with a hole instead of an extended process. As for processes, we define an attacker evaluation context as an evaluation context where all outputs and inputs in the context are tagged with at.
Note that our syntax without the eavesdropping process, opened channels and tags correspond exactly to the syntax of the original applied pi calculus.
Lastly, we consider the notion of frame that are extended processes built from 0, parallel composition, name and variable restrictions and active substitution. Given a frame ϕ, we consider the domain of ϕ, denoted dom(ϕ), as the set of free variables in ϕ that are defined by an active substitution in ϕ. Given an extended process A, we define the frame of A, denoted φ(A), as the process A where we replace all plain processes by 0. Finally, we write dom(A) as syntactic sugar for dom(φ(A)).
Operational semantics
In this section, we define the three semantics that we study in this paper, namely:
the classical semantics from the applied pi calculus, where internal communication can occur on both public and private channels; the private semantics where internal communication can only occur on private channels; and the eavesdropping semantics where the attacker is able to eavesdrop on a public channel.
We first define the structural equivalence between extended processes, denoted ≡, as the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed under renaming of names and variables, closed by application of evaluation contexts, that is associative and commutative w.r.t. |, and such that:
The three operational semantics of extended processes are defined by the structural equivalence and by three respective internal reductions, denoted → c , → p and → e . These three reductions are the smallest relations on extended processes that are closed under application of evaluation context, structural equivalence and such that:
We emphasise that the application of the rule is closed under application of arbitrary evaluation contexts. In particular the context may restrict channels, e.g. the rule C-OPEN may be used under the context νc. resulting in a private channel c, but with the attacker input/output being in the scope of this restriction. It follows from the definition of evaluation contexts that the resulting processes are always well defined. We denote by ⇒ s the reflexive, transitive closure of τ − → s for s ∈ {c, p, e}. We note that the classical semantics τ − → c is independent of the tags θ, θ , the eavesdrop actions and the ωc processes. where d is a channel name and t a term of base type. Suppose θ = θ = ho then we have that communication is only possible in the classical semantics (using twice the COMM rule):
while no transitions are available in the two other semantics. To enable communication in the eavesdropping semantics we need to explicitly add eavesdrop actions. Applying the rules C-OEAV and C-EAV we have that
We note that the first transition adds the information ωd to indicate that d is now available to the environment. Finally, if we consider that at ∈ θ, θ then internal communication on a public channel is possible and, using rules C-OPEN and C-ENV we obtain for s ∈ {p, e} that
Reachability and behavioural equivalences
We are going to compare the relation between the three semantics for the two general kind of security properties, namely reachability properties encoding security properties such as secrecy, authentication, and equivalence properties encoding anonymity, unlinkability, strong secrecy, receipt freeness, . . . . Intuitively, reachability properties encode that a process cannot reach some bad state. Equivalences define the fact that no attacker can distinguish two processes. This was originally defined by the (may)-testing equivalence [3] in the spi-calculus. An alternate equivalence, which was considered in the applied pi calculus [1] , is observational equivalence.
Reachability properties can simply be encoded by verifying the capability of a process to perform an output on a given cannel. We define A ⇓ s,θ c to hold when A = ⇒ s C[out θ (c, t).P ] for some evaluation context C that does not bind c, some term t and some plain process P , and A ⇓ s c to hold when A ⇓ s,θ c for some θ ∈ {at, ho}. For example the secrecy of s in the process νs.A can be encoded by checking whether for all attacker plain process I, we have that
Authentication properties are generally expressed as correspondence properties between events annotating processes, see e.g. [8] . A correspondence property between two events begin and end, denoted begin ⇐ end, requires that the event end is preceded by the event begin on every trace. A possible encoding of this correspondence property consists in first replacing all instances of the events in A by outputs out ho (ev, begin) and out ho (ev, end) where ev ∈ f n(A) ∪ bn(A). This new process A can then be put in parallel with a cell Cell that reads on the channel ev and stores any new value unless the value is end and the current stored value in the cell is not begin. In such a case, the cell will output on the channel bad. The correspondance property can therefore be encoded by checking whether for all attacker plain process I, we have that
bad . We say that an attacker evaluation context C[ ] is c-closing for an extended process We next introduce the two main notions of behavioural equivalences: may testing and observational equivalence. 
for all attacker evaluation contexts C[ ] s-closing for A and B.
For each of the semantics we have the usual relation between these two notions: observational equivalence implies testing equivalence.
Example 2. Consider processes A and B of Figure 2 . Process A computes a value h n (a) to be output on channel c, where h n (a) denotes n applications of h and h 0 (a) = a. The value is initially a and A may choose to either output the current value, or update the current value by applying the free symbol h. B may choose non-deterministically to either behave as A or output the fresh name s. (The non-deterministic choice is encoded by a communication on the private channel e which may be received by either the process behaving as A or the process outputting s.)
We have that A ≈ s o B. The two processes can indeed be distinguished by the context 
Labelled semantics
The internal reduction semantics introduced in the previous section requires to reason about arbitrary contexts. Similar to the original applied pi calculus, we extend the three operational semantics by a labeled operational semantics which allows processes to directly interact with the (adversarial) environment: we define the relation − → c , − → p and − → e where is part of the alphabet A = {τ, out(c, d), eav(c, d), in(c, w), νk.out(c, k), νk.eav(c, k) | c, d ∈ Ch, k ∈ X ∪ Ch and w is a term of any sort}. The labeled rules are given in Figure 3 .
where s ∈ {c, p, e}. 
for some extended processes A 1 , . . . , A n and w = 1 · . . . · n . By convention, we say that A − → s A where is the empty word. Given tr ∈ (A \ {τ }) * , we say that A tr = ⇒ s A when there exists w ∈ A * such that tr is the word w where we remove all τ actions and A w − → s A .
Example 3. Coming back to Example 1, we saw that
and no τ -actions in the other two semantics were available. Instead of explicitly adding eavesdrop actions, we can apply the rules EAV-OCH and EAV-T and obtain that
We can now define both reachability and different equivalence properties in terms of these labelled semantics and relate them to the internal reduction. To define reachability properties in the labelled semantics, we define A s c to hold when A tr = ⇒ A , tr = tr 1 out(c, t)tr 2 and tr 1 does not bind c for some tr, tr 1 , tr 2 ∈ (A \ {τ }) * , term t and extended process A .
The following proposition states that any reachability property modelled in terms of A ⇓ s,θ c and universal quantification over processes, can also be expressed using A s c without the need to quantify over processes. Next, we define equivalence relations using our labelled semantics that may serve as proof techniques for the may testing relation. First we need to define an indistinguishability relation on frames, called static equivalence. Two closed frames φ 1 and φ 2 are statically equivalent, written φ 1 ∼ φ 2 , when:
, and for all terms u, v we have that:
Example 4. Consider the equational theory generated by the equation dec(enc(x, y), y) = x. Then we have that
Intutively, the first equivalence confirms that encryption hides the plaintext when the decryption key is unknown. The second equivalence does not hold as the test (dec(x 1 , x 2 ) = E a) holds on the left hand side, but not on the right hand side. Finally, the third equivalence again holds as two restricted names are indistinguishable. Now we are ready to define two classical equivalences on processes, based on the labelled semantics: trace equivalence and labelled bisimulation. Definition 5 (Labeled bisimulations ≈ c , ≈ p , ≈ e ). Let s ∈ {c, p, e}. Let A and B two closed honest extended processes such that dom(A) = dom(B). We say that A ≈ s B if ≈ s is the largest equivalence relation such that:
We again have, as usual that labelled bisimulation implies trace equivalence.
Proposition 3. ≈ s ≈ s t for s ∈ {c, e, p}. In [1] it is shown that ≈ c o = ≈ c . We conjecture that for the new semantics p and e this same equivalence holds as well. Re-showing these results is beyond the scope of this paper, and we will mainly focus on testing/trace equivalence. As shown in [12] , for the classical semantics trace equivalence implies may testing, while the converse does not hold in general. The two relations do however coincide on image-finite processes. Note that any replication-free process is necessarily image-finite as there are only a finite number of possible traces for any given sequence of labels tr. The same relations among trace equivalence and may testing shown for the classical semantics hold also for the other semantics. The proof of this result (for the classical semantics) is given in [12] and is easily adapted to the other semantics. To see that the implication is strict, we continue Example 2 on processes A and B defined in Figure 2 . We already noted that A ≈ s m B, but will now show that A 
On the other hand, given an image-finite process, we can only have a finite number of different frames for a given trace, and therefore we can bound the context size that is necessary for distinguishing the processes.
Comparing the different semantics
In this section we state our results on comparing these semantics. We first show that, as expected, all the semantics coincide for reachability properties.
Theorem 2. For all ground, closed honest extended processes A, for all channels d, we have that
The next result is, in our opinion, more surprising. As the private semantics force the adversary to observe all information, one might expect that his distinguishing power increases over the classical one. This intuition is however wrong: the classical and private trace equivalences, testing equivalence and labelled bisimulations appear to be incomparable.
Proof. We first show that there exist A and B such that
Consider processes A and B defined in Figure 4 . In short, the result follows from the fact that if A performs an internal communication on channel c followed by an output on d (from P 1 ), B has no choice other then performing the output on d in P 2 . In the private semantics, however, the internal communication will be split in an output followed by an input: after the output on c, the input in ho (c, x).P 2 (x) following the output becomes available. More precisely, to see that A ≈ p B we first observe that if A= νs1.νs2.((out ho (c, s1).in ho (c, x).P1(x)) | (in ho (c, y).P2(y))) B= νs1.νs2.((out ho (c, s1).in ho (c, x).P2(x)) | (in ho (c, y).P1(y)))
where
To emit on channel e, processes A and B must execute P2(s1) followed by P1(s2). In the classical semantics, a trace of A emitting on e through an internal communication between out ho (c, s1) and in ho (c, y) forces B to execute P1(s1) thus preventing it to emit on e. 
Finally, if t = s 2 we also have that P 1 (t) ≈ p P 2 (t) as in particular P 1 (s 1 ) ≈ p P 2 (s 1 ). Therefore,
which allows us to conclude.
As A and B are image-finite, we have that A ≈ c m B if and only if A ≈ c t B. To see that A ≈ c t B we observe that A may perform the following transition sequence, starting with an internal communication on a public channel:
In order to mimic the behaviour of A, B must perform the same sequence of observable transitions: B νz.out(d,z) in(c,z)
We conclude as νs 1 .
This trace inequivalence has also been shown using APTE.
To show that ≈ c r ⊆ ≈ p r for r ∈ { , t, m} we show that there exist processes A and B such that A ≈ c B and A ≈ p m B. As in the first part of the proof, note that, as
and ≈ c m ⊆ ≈ p m . Consider the processes A and B defined in Figure 5 . The proof crucially relies on the fact that B may perform an internal communication in the classical semantics to mimic A, which becomes visible in the attacker in the private semantics. To see that A ≈ c B we first observe that the only first possible action from A or B is an input. In particular, given a term t, there is a unique B such that B In the private semantics, a trace of A starting with the execution of in ho (c, y) can only be matched on B by executing in ho (c, x) . B could then emit on channel c, which is not the case for A, hence yielding non equivalence. In the classic semantics, an internal communication between out ho (c, s) and in ho (c, y) allows to hide the fact that B can emit on c. Again, as A and B are image-finite may and trace equivalence coincide. To see that A ≈ p t B we first observe that A may perform the following transition sequence:
This trace disequivalence has also been shown using APTE.
One may also note that the counter-example witnessing that equivalences in the private semantics do not imply equivalences in the classical semantics is minimal: it does not use function symbols, equational reasoning, private channels, replication nor else branches. The second part of the proof relies on the use of else branches. We can however refine this result in the case of labeled bisimulation to processes without else branches, the counter-example being the same processes A and B described in the proof but where we replace each out ho (d, a) by 0. In the case of trace equivalence, we can also produce a counter-example without else branches witnessing that trace equivalences in the classical semantics do no imply trace equivalences in the private semantics but provided that we rely on a function symbol h. In the appendix of the technical report [7] ,we describe in more details these processes and give the proofs of them being counter-examples.
Next, we show that the eavesdropping semantics yields strictly stronger bisimulations and trace equivalences: the eavesdropping semantics is actually strictly included in the intersection of the classic and private semantics. A= νs1.νs2.((out ho (c, s1).in ho (c, x).P1(x)) | (in ho (c, y).P2(y))) B= νs1.νs2.((out ho (c, s1).in ho (c, x).P2(x)) | (in ho (c, y).P1(y))) where P1(x)= (if x = s1 then in ho (d, z) .if z = s1 then out ho (d, s2)) | (if x = s2 then out ho (e, x)) P2(x)= (if x = s1 then in ho (d, z) .if z = s1 then out ho (d, s2) )
To emit on channel e, processes A and B must execute P2(s1) by inputing twice s1 followed by P1(s2). In the classical semantics, an internal communication on A between out ho (c, s1) and in ho (c, y) forces B to execute P1(s1) but hides s1, preventing a second input of s1 by A. However, in the eavesdropping semantics, the internal communication reveals s1 allowing A to emit on e but not B. Fig. 6. Processes A and B such that A ≈ 
1. We first show that ≈ e ⊆ ≈ p . Suppose A≈ e B and let R be the relation witnessing this equivalence. We will show that R is also a labelled bisimulation in the private semantics. Suppose ARB.
As A≈ e B there exists B such that B = ⇒ e B and A RB . As B is a honest process no COMM-EAV transition is possible, and hence B = ⇒ p B . we have that B = ⇒ p B . 2. We next show that A ≈ e B implies A ≈ c B for any A, B. We will show that ≈ e is also a labelled bisimulation in the classical semantics. The proof relies on similar arguments as in Item 2 of the proof of Theorem 5 and the facts that νñ.
The first property is needed when an internal communication of a term or public channel is replaced by an eavesdrop action and an input. The second property handles the case when we replace the internal communication of a private channel by an application of the EAV-OCH rule and an input. 3. We now show that the implication ≈ e ≈ c ∩ ≈ c t is strict, i.e., there exist A and B such that
. Consider the processes A and B defined in Figure 6 . This example is a variant of the one given in Figure 4 . The difference is the addition of "in ho (d, z).if z = s 1 then " in processes P 1 (x) and P 2 (x): this additional check is used to verify whether the adversary learned s 1 or not. The proofs that A ≈ c B and A ≈ p B follow the same lines as in Theorem 3. We just additionally observe that νs 1 .(in ho (d, z) .if z = s 1 then out ho (d, s 2 )) ≈ s νs 1 . (in ho (d, z) .0) for s ∈ {c, p}. The trace witnessing that A ≈ e t B (which implies A ≈ e B) is again similar to the one in Theorem 3, but starting with an eavesdrop transition which allows the attacker to learn s 1 , which in turn allows him to learn s 2 and distinguish P 1 (s 2 ) from P 2 (s 2 ). We have verified A ≈ e t B using APTE which implies A ≈ e B.
Again we note that the implications are strict, even for processes containing only public channels.
Proof (Sketch).
1. We first prove that ≈ e t ⊆ ≈ p t . Suppose that A ≈ e t B. We need to show that for any A such that A 
The processes defined in Figure 6 witness this fact (cf the discussion of these processes in the proof of Theorem 4). These trace (in)equivalences have also been verified using APTE.
We note from the processes defined in Figure 6 that the implications are strict even for processes that do not communicate on private channels, do not use replication, nor else branches and terms are simply names (no function symbols nor equational theories).
Proof (Sketch). 
Furthermore, since we built C [ ] to not contain any process of the form eav(c, x).P , we deduce that rules C-EAV and C-OEAV can never be applied in a derivation of C
Similarly to Item 1, we consider a channel c and an attacker evaluation context C[ ] that is c-closing for A and B. The main difficulty of this proof is to match the application of the rule COMM in the classical semantics with the rules C-EAV and C-OEAC. However, C[ ] does not necessarily contain eavesdrop process eav(d, x) | ωc. Moreover, as mentioned in Item 1, a process eav(d, x).P has the same behavior as 0 in the classical semantics but can have a completely different behaviour in the eavesdropping semantics if P is not 0. Thus, we remove from C[ ] the eavesdrop processes, obtaining C [ ]. Then, we define a new context C [ ] based on C [ ] where will add harmless eavesdrop process eav(d, y).0. We first add in parallel the processes !eav(a, y) | ωa for all free channels a in C [ ], A and B. Moreover, since private channels can be opened, we also replace any process νd.P , in at (c, x).P where d, x are of channel type with νd.(P |!eav(d, y)) and in at (c, x).(P |!eav(x, y)). By induction of the derivations, we can show that The class of simple processes was defined in [12] . It was shown that for these processes observational and may testing equivalences coincide. Intuitively, these processes are composed of parallel basic processes. Each basic process is a sequence of input, test on the input and output actions. Moreover, importantly, each basic process has a distinct channel for communication.
Definition 7 (basic process). The set B(c, V) of basic processes built on c ∈ Ch and V ⊆ X (variables of base type) is the least set of processes that contains 0 and such that
Definition 8 (simple process).
A simple process is obtained by composing and replicating basic processes and frames, hiding some names:
where B j ∈ B(c j , ∅), B j ∈ B(c j , ∅) and c j are channel names that are pairwise distinct. The names p 1 , . . . , p n are distinct channel names that do not appear elsewhere and σ 1 , . . . , σ k are frames without restricted names (i.e. substitutions).
We have that for simple processes, all equivalences and semantics coincide.
Theorem 7. When restricted to simple processes, we have that ≈ s1 r1 = ≈ s2 r2 for r 1 , r 2 ∈ { , o, m, t} and s 1 , s 2 ∈ {c, p, e}.
Proof. The result when s 1 = s 2 = c was shown in [12] . As for simple processes, all parallel processes have distinct channels, the internal communication rule may never be triggered, and therefore it is easy to show that the three semantics coincide.
I/O-unambiguous processes
Restricting processes to simple processes is often too restrictive. For instance, when verifying unlinkability and anonymity properties, two outputs by different parties should not be distinguishable due to the channel name. We therefore introduce another class of processes, that we call io-unambiguous for which we also show that the different semantics (although not the different equivalences) do coincide.
Intuitively, an io-unambiguous process forbids an output and input on the same public channel to follow each other directly (or possibly with only conditionals in between). For instance, we forbid processes of the form out θ (c, t).in θ (c, x).P , out θ (c, t).(in θ (c, x). P | Q) as well as out θ (c, t).if t 1 = t 2 then P else in θ (c, x).Q. We however allow inputs and outputs on the same channel in parallel.
where tr p is obtained by replacing in tr each νz.eav(c, z) by νz.out(c, z).in(c, z).
Thanks to the property P, we conclude that B tr = ⇒ e B . 2. To prove ≈ p ⊆ ≈ e , we assume that A,B are two closed honest extended processes such that A ≈ p B and let R be the relation witnessing this equivalence. We will show that R is also a labelled bisimulation in the eavesdropping semantics. Suppose ARB. 
Different semantics in practice
As we have seen, in general, the three proposed semantics may yield different results. A conservative approach would consist in verifying always the eavesdropping semantics which is stronger than the two other ones, as shown before. However, this semantics seems also to be the least efficient one to verify.
We have implemented the three different semantics in the APTE tool, for processes with static channels, i.e. inputs and outputs may only have names in the channel position and not variables. This allowed us to investigate the difference in results and performance between the semantics.
In our experiments we considered several examples from APTE's repository:
the Private Authentication protocol proposed by Abadi and Fournet [2] ; the passive authentication protocol implemented in the European Passport protocol [16, 4] ; the French and UK versions of the Basic Access Protocol (BAC) implemented in the European passport [16, 5] .
For all these examples we found that the results, i.e., whether trace equivalence holds or not, was unchanged, independent of the semantics. However, as expected, performance of the private semantics was generally better. The existing protocol encodings generally used a single public channel. To enforce I/O-unambiguity, we introduced different channels and, surprisingly, noted that distinct channels significantly enhance the tool's performance. (The model using different channels in the case of RFID protocols such as the electronic passport is certainly questionable.)
The results are summarised in the following table. For each protocol we considered the original encoding, and a slightly changed one which enforces I/O-unambiguity. In the results column we mark an attack by a cross (×) and a successful verification with a check mark ( ). In case of an attack we generally considered the minimal number of sessions needed to find the attack. In case of a successful verification we consider more sessions, which is the reason for the much higher verification times. 
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated two families of Dolev-Yao models, depending on how the hypothesis that the attacker controls the network is reflected. While the two semantics coincide for reachability properties, they yield incomparable notions of behavioral equivalences, which have recently been extensively used to model privacy properties.
The fact that forcing all communication to be routed through the attacker may diminish his distinguishing power may at first seem counter-intuitive. We also propose a third semantics, where internal communication among honest participants is permitted but leaks the message to the attacker. This new communication semantics entails strictly stronger equivalences than the two classical ones. We also identify two subclasses of protocols for which (some) semantics coincide. Finally, we implemented the three semantics in the APTE tool. Our experiments showed that the three semantics provide the same result on the case studies in the APTE example repository. However, the private semantics is slightly more efficient, as less interleavings have to be considered. Our results illustrate that behavioral equivalences are much more subtle than reachability properties and the need to carefully choose the precise attacker model.
